

scene. Outside London, or even a little further away from Whitehall within London, such an arrangement would be quite impossible. Where it is possible, attendance by the Police Commander at particular meetings can be very valuable in ensuring an identity of understanding of the different points of view at the scene and in COBR. That identity of understanding is the overriding objective, and with that in mind I would make two stipulations. First, if the Police Commander attends COBR the Government liaison officer must do so too: otherwise the latter will cease to be sufficiently well informed about perceptions and events at both ends to be able to carry out his liaison function between COBR meetings. Second, where it is geographically impossible for the Police Commander to attend COBR meetings ~~it would be a great mistake to appoint~~ a police liaison officer from the force handling the incident to sit in COBR (which is in the mind of some in the MoD who are forwarding this suggestion). The danger of such an approach would be that the Police Commander would talk to "his man" in the COBR while Government representatives would talk to "their man" at the scene. That is not the way to create the identity of purpose, perception and team work which our present procedures seem admirably to offer.

d) I am doubtful about the McD's suggestion that briefing on the various military specialisms should be included at the senior command and staff courses at Bramshill: there would be a great danger that the knowledge of police officers involved in the incident would not be up to date. It is our job in F4 first to ensure that the GIO is sufficiently well informed, through our close contact with the military units, about their specialist capabilities; second, as GIO, to serve as the bridge between the police at the scene and the military experts in COBR; and third to make sure that [redacted]

e) Cabinet Office ([redacted] letter of 12 September): communications certainly went much better this time than on some exercises: but we were in London. Quite apart from the separate consideration being given to the provision of Brahms sets for other purposes, I think the Home Office should give serious consideration to holding a Brahms set in this building for the GLO (suitably instructed on how to connect it to take it with him to the site of the incident. I agree with the Cabinet Office comments about the usefulness of the secure teleprinter. It not only kept us in touch at the scene with telegrams from Tripoli, it meant that we had compiled a library of source material for which memory and manuscript notes during a ten day incident simply could not have substituted.

f)

29. This would need to be discussed with the GPO Office via a telephone call to the
central group for their comments before it would come to the Group with the
recommendations of the GPO.